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The University of Natal in South Africa placed a large advertisement in 
the October 24, 1971 issue of the New York Times asking “suitably qualified 
persons” to apply to teach economics, social anthropology, ceramics, voice, 
engineering, chemistry, and computer science.1 A few weeks later, the Times 
ran an ad from the University of Witswatersrand seeking lecturers in 
philosophy and medical sociology.2 In December, a “Blue Chip Corporation” 
advertised for a “General Manager for its South African Subsidiary”; the 
candidate “[m]ust be willing to relocate to Johannesburg.”3 None of these job 
ads mentioned race as a qualification—in fact, the “Blue Chip Corporation” 
claimed to be “An Equal Opportunity Employer”4—but given how restrictive 
South African apartheid laws were, such professional jobs were almost 
certainly only available to white applicants.5 And since those designated as 
white by the South African government were less than twenty percent of the 
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1 Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1971, at E12. 
2 Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1971, at E9. 
3 Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1971, at F16. 
4 Id. 
5 U.N. Dep’t of Political & Sec. Council Affairs, Unit on Apartheid, Basic Facts on the Republic 
of South Africa and the Policy of Apartheid, at 17-23, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A/12 (1972) 
(describing how apartheid worked to “restrict opportunities for . . . advancement” for nonwhite 
South Africans). 
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country’s population, South African employers turned abroad for eligible 
applicants.6 
Anti-apartheid activists of the era saw the publication of such 
employment ads as evidence of the New York Times’ complicity with South 
African apartheid and pointed to the paper’s hypocrisy in running such ads 
while editorializing against South Africa’s white supremacist regime. What’s 
more, they complained, the ads violated New York City’s broad Human 
Rights Law that, as part of its prohibition on employment discrimination, 
targeted job ads within the city that “directly or indirectly” discriminated on 
the basis of race.7 This Article examines how the activists’ statutory challenge 
to these ads precipitated a constitutional struggle in a municipal agency: how 
anti-apartheid activists worked with the New York City Commission on 
Human Rights (CCHR) to build a statutory case against the New York Times, 
how the Times defended itself with constitutional arguments about the 
CCHR’s limited powers, how the CCHR asserted its own broad 
constitutional authority to regulate, and how New York courts ultimately 
balanced these statutory and constitutional arguments. 
This case study builds on existing scholarship on administrative 
constitutionalism, kicked off almost a decade ago by Sophia Z. Lee’s work on 
economic regulatory agencies and the Fourteenth Amendment. Lee defines 
administrative constitutionalism as “regulatory agencies’ interpretation and 
implementation of constitutional law”; others have since defined the term to 
encompass a wider variety of administrative behavior and statutory 
construction.8 Taken broadly, this scholarship asks us to take administrators 
seriously as constitutional actors, and to tease out the mix of constitutional 
 
6 Id. at 3, 5. 
7 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-7.0(1)(d) (1972) (“It shall be an unlawful 
discriminatory practice: . . . [f]or any employer or employment agency to print or circulate . . . any 
statement, advertisement or publication . . . which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation, 
specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed, color, national origin . . . .”). 
8 Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 
1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (2010). For a broader take that includes legislative action, 
see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33 (2010), which defines administrative constitutionalism as “the process 
by which legislative and executive officials, America’s primary governmental norm entrepreneurs, 
advance new fundamental principles and policies.” For taxonomies of the field, see Sophia Z. Lee, 
From the History to the Theory of Administrative Constitutionalism, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM 
THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 109, 109 & n.1 
(Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017), which calls for more precision in discussions of “administrative 
constitutionalism,” and Gillian Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 
1903-15 (2013). 
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and statutory interpretation, and of legal, intellectual, and political motives 
involved in administrative decisionmaking.9 
This article builds on and complicates this scholarship in several ways. 
First, as Bertrall Ross notes, administrative constitutionalism differs from 
regular (read: judicial) constitutionalism at least in part because of the way 
political pressures and outside groups are built into the administrative state.10 
And as Karen Tani points out, we need more work on the granular details of 
administrative constitutionalism and on the stakes involved.11 This particular 
case study of anti-apartheid activism at a municipal commission describes the 
winners and losers in a fight over racial discrimination and demonstrates how 
the municipal commission context, and the presence of external groups, 
mattered. Here agency officials worked with anti-apartheid groups and their 
lawyers to coordinate legal and constitutional strategies. Activists drew on 
the CCHR’s enforcement authority while the always under-resourced CCHR 
likely benefited from the lawyering help. 
Second, while most scholarship on administrative constitutionalism has 
focused on federal agencies, little attention has been paid to state and local 
 
9 See, e.g., SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO 
THE NEW RIGHT 3-5, 158-67 (2014) (examining Fourteenth Amendment interpretation by officials 
at the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal 
Power Commission after the New Deal); Kristin A. Collins, Bureaucracy as the Border: Administrative 
Law and the Citizen Family, 66 DUKE L.J. 1727, 1729 (2017) (examining bureaucrats’ role in shaping 
immigration and naturalization law in the twentieth century); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative 
Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59, 64 (examining 
how contemporary national security officials have been free to develop their own rules and norms 
around privacy and surveillance); Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the 
Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 557-58 (2007) (demonstrating how postal 
officials’ interpretations of the Fourth Amendment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were 
later adopted by courts); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2014) (focusing on the role of Progressive-era executive branch 
lawyers in crafting civil liberties law); Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative 
Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2000) (looking at how 
state and federal administrators in the early twentieth century interpreted the First Amendment to 
allow significant regulation of speech); Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 828-30 (2015) 
(describing Fourteenth Amendment interpretation by federal bureaucrats administering welfare 
programs in the middle of the twentieth century). 
10 Bertrall L. Ross II, Administrative Constitutionalism as Popular Constitutionalism, 167 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1783, 1806-09 (2019). 
11 See Karen M. Tani, Administrative Constitutionalism at the “Borders of Belonging”: Drawing on 
History to Expand the Archive and Change the Lens, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1603, 1628 (2019) (calling on 
scholars “to consider, as systematically as possible, who has reaped the benefits of administrative 
constitutionalism and who has borne the burdens”); Tani, supra note 9, at 830 (asserting that “we 
badly need additional empirical work, especially on constitutional interpretations that intersect with 
the theories and practices of American federalism”). 
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agencies’ constitutional engagement.12 While scholars have fruitfully explored 
dynamics of administrative federalism, their focus often remains on the federal 
courts, or the activities of federal bureaucrats interacting with state and local 
governments.13 If we broaden our focus, however, we can see local officials 
grappling with some of the same constitutional questions as federal ones—for 
example, the extent to which the First Amendment limited the CCHR’s 
ability to regulate South African advertising. And in other ways, the 
institutional dynamics of state and local politics are markedly different from 
those at the federal level, and state and local administrative law varies 
accordingly.14 More specifically, state and local antidiscrimination 
commissions often operate in ways that differ from federal ones (early CCHR 
commissioners, for example, volunteered their time15), but there is 
surprisingly little current scholarship on how they operate as institutions and 
how they grapple with constitutional questions.16 And unlike work on 
 
12 Notable exceptions include Schiller, supra note 9, and Katherine Shaw, State Administrative 
Constitutionalism, 69 ARK. L. REV. 527, 528 (2016), which turns needed attention to the largely 
overlooked practice of state bureaucrats engaging in constitutional interpretation. 
13 See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2028 
(2008) (arguing that “the Court is unwilling to curb Congress on federalism grounds and is instead 
addressing federalism concerns through an administrative law framework”); Tani, supra note 9, at 
837-43 (tying together state and federal policy to examine how federal officials developed a theory 
of “administrative equal protection”); Shaw, supra note 12, at 530-31 (describing how “state agencies 
figure in cooperative federalism analyses primarily as conduits for state interests in federal 
regulatory processes”). 
14 Scholarship on state approaches to Chevron deference makes this clear. See Aaron Saiger, 
Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 560-70 (2014) 
(explaining how institutional factors are behind the wide variety of state Chevron applications). 
15 See N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CHALLENGE OF EQUALITY: THE WORK 
OF THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1970–1977, at 79 (1977) (describing 
how, prior to a 1973 revision of the authorizing law, the CCHR was required to use “unpaid, lay, 
volunteer Commissioners . . . as hearing officers. The need to coordinate the schedules of two 
volunteer hearing officers, each with his own full-time professional responsibilities that necessarily 
limited time available to the Commission, produced serious scheduling delays.”). 
16 See RONALD A. KRAUSS, STATE CIVIL RIGHTS AGENCIES: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 
27 (1986) (“There is no doubt . . . that the establishment and maintenance of state civil rights 
agencies has secured in large part the legal framework that has the capability to protect against illegal 
discrimination.”); David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: 
Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943–1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1074-77 
(2011) (examining the development of state fair employment commissions in the post-World War II 
era); Burton Levy, The Bureaucracy of Race: Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws and Its Impact on People, 
Process, and Organization, 2 J. BLACK STUD. 77 (1971) (examining the operation of nondiscrimination 
agencies at various levels of government); Kenneth L. Saunders & Hyo Eun (April) Bang, A 
Historical Perspective on U.S. Human Rights Commissions 4-10, Executive Session Papers (Human 
Rights Commissions and Criminal Justice Executive Session Paper No. 3 2007) (offering a brief 
comparative history of city, county, and state human rights commissions). A small number of studies 
have examined the work of the New York City Commission on Human Rights. See GERALD 
BENJAMIN, RACE RELATIONS AND THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
(1974) (offering a critical history of the CCHR); N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 
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administrative constitutionalism in federal agencies that explores how 
administrators have relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause,17 states’ expansive police powers allow states and localities to pass 
robust antidiscrimination statutes that go beyond the Equal Protection 
Clause to cover a wide array of public and private action. In the case of the 
CCHR, a key issue was not whether the Equal Protection Clause imposed 
affirmative obligations but rather how far a municipal agency with broad 
statutory authority could go to regulate matters arguably reserved to the 
federal government by the Constitution. While many have examined how 
courts have parsed the federal government’s preemption of foreign affairs 
issues,18 there is little scholarship on how local commissions grapple with such 
questions. The Constitution protects both the federal government’s control 
over foreign affairs and states’ and localities’ control over their internal affairs. 
Here the CCHR considered the scope of federal foreign affairs authority as 
it defended its own authority to regulate matters it saw as profoundly local. 
The CCHR’s expansive local powers were attractive to activists who had 
more enthusiasm than authority. Recognizing the White House’s exclusive 
control over foreign policy, and the Nixon administration’s move toward 
closer ties with South Africa,19 anti-apartheid activists in the early 1970s 
explicitly sought alternative paths—including federal agency challenges and 
litigation in state and federal courts—to challenge American institutions’ 
relationships with South Africa. As pioneering human rights lawyer Gay 
McDougall later recalled, “some of the early efforts to use the domestic courts 
 
15 (cataloging developments in the CCHR’s structure and jurisdiction); Committee on Civil Rights, 
It Is Time to Enforce the Law: A Report on Fulfilling the Promise of the New York City Human Rights Law, 
57 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 235, 236 (2002) (cataloging the CCHR’s deficiencies and concluding 
that “it is impossible to prevent and remedy discrimination effectively unless the tools employed in 
the effort include a sustained commitment to confront discrimination as a law enforcement problem 
as serious as any other”); Michael H. Schill, Local Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in 
Housing: The New York City Human Rights Commission, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 991, 991 (1996) 
(evaluating the CCHR’s role in combating housing discrimination); Marta B. Varela, The First Forty 
Years of the Commission on Human Rights, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 983 (1995) (providing a brief 
overview of the CCHR’s statutory authority over time); Eleanor Holmes Norton, Book Review, 3 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 523, 524 (1975) (critiquing the conclusions of GERALD BENJAMIN, RACE 
RELATIONS AND THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1974)). 
17 See generally LEE, supra note 9; Lee, supra note 8. 
18 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
149-70 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing generally “the states and foreign affairs”); Curtis A. Bradley, 
Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 721-25 (2000) (discussing dormant foreign 
affairs preemption); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1410, 1414-18 (1999) (criticizing federal courts’ ability to determine when 
foreign relations are at stake); Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an 
Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 842-46 (1986) (describing the 
constitutional limits on state activities touching foreign affairs). 
19 ALEX THOMSON, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, 1948-
1994: CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 74-78 (2008). 
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to enforce human rights norms were attempts to sever ties between the 
apartheid system and U.S. entities.”20 Challenging the actions of the New 
York Times in New York City, under New York City’s Human Rights Law, 
seemed like one way to address the issue of apartheid while avoiding the 
White House’s exclusive control over foreign policy. The legal issues proved 
trickier than activists had hoped, however. Was the CCHR authorized to root 
out all discrimination within state boundaries, regardless of the source? Or 
did striking a blow, however local, against South Africa’s apartheid regime 
necessarily constitute foreign policy? How much deference to administrative 
expertise was appropriate when matters touched on constitutional questions, 
and when local commissioners were less expert? Existing scholarship on the 
constitutional questions in this case has largely focused on judges’ resistance 
to addressing human rights policy through domestic civil rights litigation and 
judges’ questionable use of the act of state doctrine as an avoidance 
technique.21 Much less attention, however, has been paid to how lawyers at 
and for the CCHR, spurred by anti-apartheid activists and motivated by 
human rights concerns, used statutory and constitutional law to defend the 
Commission’s right to regulate. 
 
20 Vanita Gupta, Blazing a Path from Civil Rights to Human Rights: The Pioneering Career of 
Gay McDougall, in BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 151 (Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine Albisa & Martha F. Davis eds., 2007) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
21 See, e.g., Goler Teal Butcher, Southern African Issues in United States Courts, 26 HOW. L.J. 601, 
637 (1983) (“[T]he basic lesson learned from this series of cases involving southern African issues is 
that United States tribunals, judicial or administrative, were not inclined to deal with those novel 
actions whose foreign policy and political ramifications on one hand and complex legal issues on the 
other could be avoided through traditional judicial escape routes.”); Richard B. Lillich, The Role of 
Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 153, 155 (1978) 
(noting that “the courts have invoked a variety of techniques to bypass actual determination of the 
substantive issues presented to them”); W. Michael Reisman, Foreign Affairs and the Several States: 
Outline of a Theory for Decision, in AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 71ST ANNUAL 
MEETING 182, 188 (1977) (arguing that the Court of Appeals’ “decision has an extraordinary number 
of errors of international law and is particularly baffling in that it relies on an act of state doctrine 
and certain earlier decisions which have now been reversed and, moreover, do not apply to the facts 
of the case”); Joseph A. Rideout, Recent Decisions: Jurisdiction, 15 VA. J. INT’L L. 467, 480 (1975) 
(calling the New York Supreme Court’s act of state reasoning “a novel and unwarranted application 
of a well-established doctrine”); Peter Q. Montori, Note, The Act of State Doctrine Applied to 
Discrimination in Employment Advertising, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 371, 373 (1978) (“Reliance on the 
act of state doctrine . . . demonstrates an acute concern for the motivations supposedly underlying 
the complaint.”); Terri E. Simon, Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: International Consensus and 
Public Policy Considerations, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 283, 306 (1975) (“By its wooden application 
of the act of state doctrine in a novel situation, the New York Supreme Court has erected a serious 
obstacle to enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation in any case where the interests of a foreign 
government are involved.”); Renee J. Sobel, Comment, New York Times Co. v. City of New York 
Commission on Human Rights: Act of State Misapplied, 44 BROOK. L. REV. 175, 186 (1977) (noting 
that the New York Court of Appeals had “for the first time extended the act of state doctrine to 
shield from judicial intervention the local acts of a domestic corporation”). 
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*      *      * 
The New York Times’ job ads were flagged by the American Committee on 
Africa (ACOA), the leading American anti-apartheid group in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. ACOA’s efforts in this period ranged widely, from disseminating 
information on conditions in South Africa, to working with civil rights groups 
to organize demonstrations against banks and businesses invested in South 
Africa, to pushing back on U.S. involvement in South Africa.22 Advertising 
was one target of ACOA’s many efforts to make it difficult for South Africa 
to entice American tourists; in 1969 ACOA had successfully pressured a few 
publications to refuse ads for South African Airways (SAA), and had 
convinced the Civil Aeronautics Board that SAA ads that were silent as to 
apartheid restrictions on tourist sites were in fact deceptive.23 
In 1970 and 1971, ACOA staffers repeatedly wrote to the Times to protest 
that its publication of South African job ads violated state and city 
antidiscrimination laws (which closely resembled each other).24 New York 
City’s Human Rights Law barred employment ads that “express[], directly or 
indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to age, race, 
creed, color, national origin or sex, or any intent to make any such limitation, 
specification or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational 
qualification.”25 Although nothing in the ads explicitly stated that the jobs 
in question were reserved for white applicants, ACOA staffers argued that 
 
22 DONALD R. CULVERSON, CONTESTING APARTHEID: U.S. ACTIVISM, 1960-1987, at 43-50 
(1999); ROBERT KINLOCH MASSIE, LOOSING THE BONDS: THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH 
AFRICA IN THE APARTHEID YEARS (1997); FRANCIS NJUBI NESBITT, RACE FOR SANCTIONS: 
AFRICAN AMERICANS AGAINST APARTHEID, 1946-1994 (2004); David Hostetter, “An International 
Alliance of People of All Nations Against Racism”: Nonviolence and Solidarity in the Antiapartheid Activism 
of the American Committee on Africa, 1952–1965, 32 PEACE & CHANGE 134 (2007); Joanna L. 
Grisinger, “South Africa is the Mississippi of the World”: Anti-Apartheid Activism Through Domestic Civil 
Rights Law, L. & HIST. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 38) (on file with author). 
23 “Summary: Immediate Results of South African Airways Campaign” (July 22, 1969), in 
Records of the American Committee on Africa, Part 2: Correspondence and Subject Files on South 
Africa, 1952–1985 (on file with the Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, Reel 9, Box 104, 
Folder 14); see Grisinger, supra note 22, at 38-39 (“Ads welcoming all Americans were deceptive, 
Diggs protested . . . . [O]n this matter, at least, the CAB was willing to act.”). 
24 Letter from Janet M. Hooper, Executive Associate, ACOA, to Editor, Advertising 
Acceptability Department, New York Times (Aug. 12, 1970), in Douglas Wachholz Collection on the 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Africa Project [hereinafter Wachholz Papers] (on 
file with the Michigan State University Libraries, Special Collections, MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4); 
Letter from Janet M. Hooper to J.J. Furey, Advertising Acceptability Department, New York Times 
(July 2, 1971), in Wachholz Papers, supra (MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4); Letter from Janet M. Hooper 
to J.J. Furey (Sept 1, 1971) in Wachholz Papers, supra (MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4); Letter from Richard 
W. Leonard, Executive Assistant, ACOA, to J.J. Furey (Nov. 2, 1971), in Wachholz Papers, supra 
(MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4); see Act of July 16, 1965, ch. 851, § 3, 1965 N.Y. Laws 2037, 2038-39; 
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-7.0(1)(d) (1972). 
25 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-7.0(1)(d) (1972). 
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the location itself indirectly expressed race discrimination, given South 
Africa’s white supremacist regime and New Yorkers’ public knowledge 
thereof. And municipal law held liable not just the employer publishing 
or circulating such ads, but also anyone aiding such behavior26—so the Times, 
they argued, was liable. 
However, the Times was generally dismissive of ACOA’s written 
requests.27 A phone call in October 1971 did no more; the head of the Times’ 
Advertising Acceptability Department suggested to an ACOA staffer that if 
the city and state human rights agencies responsible for enforcing civil rights 
laws (copied on some of ACOA’s correspondence) had not acted, there was 
no problem.28 ACOA’s efforts intensified when lawyers from the Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (LCCRUL) got involved on ACOA’s 
behalf. The LCCRUL, founded in 1963 when the Kennedy Administration 
asked prominent law firms to get involved in domestic civil rights litigation, 
had a small Southern Africa Project that assisted lawyers in South Africa and 
managed litigation of Southern Africa-related matters in the United States.29 
Peter J. Connell, director of the LCCRUL’s Southern Africa Project, wrote 
to Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger in May 1972 that agreeing to cease 
publication of such ads was obviously the right decision. It “would bring the 
New York Times’ advertising practices into conformity with applicable state 
and municipal law; would be simple to administer; would not involve the 
broad imposition of value judgements in the advertisement screening process; 
and would obviate the need to pursue relief before the Human Rights 
Commission.”30 The Times declined; as David S. Tatel of the LCCRUL 
surmised, it was “probably on the basis that such compliance could have been 
misconstrued as a step toward bringing the advertising policy of the Times 
 
26 Id. § B1-7.0(6). 
27 See Letter from J.J. Furey to Janet M. Hooper (July 6, 1971), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 
24 (MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4); Letter from J.J. Furey to Janet M. Hooper (Aug. 17, 1970), in 
Wachholz Papers, supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4). 
28 Notes of K.W. on Phone Conversation with J.J. Furey (Oct. 4, 1971), in Wachholz Papers, 
supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 2, Folder 8). 
29 ANN GARITY CONNELL, THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW: 
THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC INTEREST LAW GROUP 214-20 (2003); LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, 10 YEAR REPORT 96-100 (1973); Howard Tolley, Jr., Interest Group 
Litigation to Enforce Human Rights, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 617, 620 (1990); Myra Ann Houser, Lawyering 
Against Apartheid: The Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, 1967–1994 (May 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Howard University) (on file with author). 
30 Letter from Peter J. Connell, Exec. Dir., Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, to 
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Publisher, N.Y. Times, at 2 (May 15, 1972), in Gay McDougall Papers, 1967–
1999, Series I: Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Southern Africa Project, Subseries 
I.3: Case Files [hereinafter McDougall Papers] (on file with the Columbia University Rare Book 
and Manuscript Library, HR 016, Box 45, Folder 4). 
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into line with its editorial policy.”31 This wall between advertising and 
editorial content was, of course, the source of activists’ concern. 
ACOA and its lawyers then turned to the City Commission on Human 
Rights, where officials had already tried to stop South African apartheid from 
touching New Yorkers. In 1969 CCHR officials had met informally with SAA 
and South African Tourist Corporation representatives over allegations of 
discrimination in South African travel arrangements.32 The next year, the 
CCHR’s General Counsel warned an employment agency against placing ads 
for positions in South Africa: “Although no limitation is stated in the ad, it is 
obvious that South Africa’s racial policies will exclude from consideration any 
black person, should one apply.”33 And in June 1972, the CCHR filed a 
complaint against a handful of travel businesses promoting South African 
travel on the grounds that they were violating the New York City Human 
Rights Law by advertising segregated tourism.34 CCHR chair Eleanor 
Holmes Norton had earlier reflected in correspondence with ACOA that 
since the various travel and employment ads they had flagged did not include 
explicitly discriminatory language, “any legal action which might be feasible 
will likely have to be based upon a broad and innovative interpretation of our 
statute.”35 However, the CCHR was game. As Norton argued when filing the 
complaint: 
I find it disgraceful that the most outright racist country in the world is 
allowed to peddle its wares here unchallenged. New Yorkers alone cannot 
force the Republic of South Africa to change her inhumane laws, but we must 
certainly do what we can to prevent that Republic from profiting at our 
expense.36 
 
31 Memorandum from David S. Tatel to Co-Chairmen of the Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights 
Under Law 2 (Oct. 19, 1972), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 235, Folder 1). 
32 Applicant’s Exhibit 11 at 2, South African Airways, C.A.B. Docket No. 24944, in Selected 
Docket Files, 1938–1984, Docket Section, Records of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Record Group 
197 (on file with the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Box 994). 
The CCHR declined to pursue this complaint. 
33 Letter of Franklin E. White, Gen. Counsel, CCHR, to Alan Redfield, Remer-Ribolow Emp’t 
Agency (Sept. 15, 1970), Case No. 5787-PA (on file with the New York City Municipal Archives, 
Commission on Human Rights Collection [hereinafter NYCMA], Box 7055970, Folder 1). However, 
the State Division of Human Rights appeared skeptical that the publication of the ad violated the State 
Human Rights Law. Letter from Florence V.  Lucas, Assistant Comm’r, N.Y. State Div. of Human 
Rights, to Janet Hooper, Exec. Assistant, ACOA (n.d.) (on file with NYCMA, Box 7055970, Folder 1).  
34  Complaint, Kuoni Travel, Inc., No. 5627-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights June 
5, 1972), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 103, Folder 9); see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. 
CODE ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-7.0(2) (1972). 
35 Letter from Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, to Richard W. Leonard, Exec. Assistant, 
ACOA (Dec. 22, 1971), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 2, Folder 8). 
36 Mrs. Norton Scores 8 for Travel Bigs, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, June 17, 1972, at B8 (quotation 
marks omitted). 
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In October 1972, lawyers from LCCRUL representing ACOA, Judge 
William H. Booth (the former chair of the CCHR and the then-current 
president of ACOA), the African Heritage Studies Association, and One 
Hundred Black Men filed a formal complaint with the CCHR, asking the 
Commission to order the Times to cease and desist publishing such ads.37 This 
arena made sense: “While the New York City Human Rights Commission 
may not have the legal authority to compel South Africa employers to desist 
from discrimination in their country, it certainly has the authority—and the 
responsibility—to assure [sic] that recruitment efforts which take place in 
New York City comply with the city’s civil rights laws.”38 By March 1973, the 
tourism complaint had fizzled out, but the CCHR found probable cause that 
the Times “has engaged in or is engaging in the unlawful discriminatory 
practice complained of” and ordered a conciliation hearing.39 
Lawyers for the Times moved to stop the proceedings and dismiss the 
complaint. Prominent First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams, representing 
the Times, wrote to Norton arguing that the CCHR had no authority to act, 
“because it would constitute both an intrusion by the city into the foreign 
affairs of the United States, and—more importantly to us—a violation of the 
First Amendment.”40 On the First Amendment point, the Times protested 
the CCHR’s claim of authority to tell a newspaper what it could and could 
not publish. Since nothing in the text of the ads said anything explicit about 
preferring white applicants, the idea that a reference to “South Africa” was 
implicitly discriminatory placed an “unconstitutional burden” on the Times to 
review each ad or suffer consequences.41 As the Times argued: “Any action of 
the Commission in requiring newspapers to screen employment 
advertisements at their peril simply cannot be squared with the First 
Amendment.”42 During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Abrams 
claimed that the words “South Africa” could not be deemed discriminatory; 
 
37 See Complaint, Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of New York Comm’n on Human 
Rights Oct. 12, 1972), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6). 
38 Background Information at 5 (n.d.), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 
235, Folder 1). 
39 Determination and Order After Investigation, Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of 
N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights Mar. 29, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 
45, Folder 4). Lawyers at the CCHR also acknowledged that targeting individual advertisers only 
went so far; “[i]f, however, we could prevent publishers from publishing such ads, regardless of the 
source, under an aiding & abetting theory, we could have a broader effect.” Memorandum of Jane 
[Adams] to Bev [Gross], at 2 (Mar. 16, 1973) (on file with NYCMA, Box 7055970, Folder 5). 
40 Letter from Floyd Abrams to Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, New York City Commisssion 
on Human Rights, at 1 (May 21, 1973) (on file with NYCMA, Box 7055970, Folder 5). 
41 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 21, Am. Comm. on Africa, 
No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights May 21, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra 
note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 4). 
42 Id. 
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“there is simply no way that The Times or the press of this country can cope 
with a standard of law such as that sets forth.”43 Which other countries 
discriminated? Against whom? And when did law on the books differ from 
law in practice? As Abrams explained, “surely one would have to know what 
in fact is the practice at this University in South Africa as to who it will hire 
to teach the cello. Surely this is not an acceptable burden for The New York 
Times to go through, or for the press to go through in general.”44 Although 
the newspaper did already provide for some limited review of the ads, what 
the CCHR was demanding would, they argued, go well beyond the Times’ 
existing practices. Times policy excluded ads that (among other disqualifying 
characteristics) “fail[] to comply with its widely accepted high standards of 
decency and dignity” or that “discriminate on racial or religious grounds.”45 
Staff in the Advertising Acceptability Department reviewed those ads 
deemed questionable and vetted ads for “taste” (for example, the Times would 
only advertise the film “Deep Throat” as “Throat”).46 Evaluating a country’s 
practices would require much more, however. 
On the foreign affairs question, the Times argued that a hearing on these 
ads by a municipal commission would be “an unconstitutional interference by 
a city with the foreign policy of the United States.”47 Complainants, they 
charged, were anti-apartheid activists who were really more concerned with 
South Africa’s employment discrimination than with the specific ads printed 
in New York City. Calling the suit a “subterfuge to avoid the South African 
Government’s immunity,” the Times argued that “the action is fundamentally 
an inquiry into the employment policy of the government of South Africa. 
Such an inquiry cannot validly be undertaken.”48 And an order by the CCHR 
would be an act of foreign policy, something reserved to the federal 
government by the Constitution. The Times relied on Zschernig v. Miller, in 
which the Supreme Court had rejected an Oregon inheritance law that barred 
nonresident aliens from inheriting property unless their own country offered 
a reciprocal right to inherit. The Court found that this law, which required 
 
43 Transcript of Hearing dated June 6, 1973, Jan. 14, 1974, and Jan. 31, 1974, reproduced in Record 
on Appeal at 68, N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1975) (No. 11244-1974) [hereinafter CCHR Hearing Transcript], in McDougall Papers, 
supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 187, Folder 16). 
44 Id. at 69. 
45 New York Times, Standards of Advertising Acceptability at 2, 5, in McDougall Papers, supra 
note 30 (HR 016, Box 187, Folder 2). 
46 Memorandum to File from Rod Boggs at 1 (May 1, 1973), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24 
(MSS 415, Box 2, Folder 8). 
47 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 1, Am. Comm. on Africa, 
No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights May 21, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra 
note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 4). 
48 Id. at 15-16 & n.*. 
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Oregon courts to delve deeply into the law of foreign countries, was “an 
intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution 
entrusts to the President and the Congress.”49 Although simply referring to 
foreign law, or taking actions with “some incidental or indirect effect in 
foreign countries,” was acceptable,50 the Oregon statute “seems to make 
unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian 
basis than our own.”51 Thus, the Court held, “its great potential for disruption 
or embarrassment makes us hesitate to place it in the category of a diplomatic 
bagatelle.”52 A municipal commission evaluating the employment laws and 
practices of South Africa, the Times argued, was similarly dangerous. 
Not only that, they argued, the CCHR’s inquiry into South African 
employment law would violate the “act of state” doctrine, a pragmatic judicial 
rule of restraint intended to keep nations out of each other’s affairs. The 
Supreme Court had declared in Underhill v. Hernandez that “[e]very 
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign 
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of 
the government of another done within its own territory.”53 The Court’s 
subsequent decisions in this area rejected challenges in American courts to a 
foreign government’s actions within that government’s own territory. (These 
cases included claims against a Venezuelan official who refused to give an 
American citizen a passport to leave the city of Bolivar;54 a claim to recover 
land in Panama seized by the Costa Rican government;55 claims to recover 
animal hides56 and lead bullion57 seized by officials in Mexico; and a claim for 
payments for sugar expropriated by the Cuban government.58) As the Court 
explained in 1964, the doctrine had “‘constitutional’ underpinnings” based in 
the idea that the constitutional separation of powers meant that courts should 
stay out of foreign policy matters.59 The judiciary had determined “that its 
engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may 
hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and 
for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.”60 By 
this logic, municipal commissions should also avoid judging the acts of other 
 
49 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). 
50 Id. at 433 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)). 
51 Id. at 440. 
52 Id. at 435. 
53 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
54 See generally id. 
55 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
56 Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). 
57 Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918). 
58 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
59 Id. at 423. 
60 Id. 
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countries. Since South African law was at the heart of the CCHR complaint, 
the Times argued, the Commission had no jurisdiction to judge it. 
The Times drew directly on the recent decision in South African Airways 
v. New York Division of Human Rights, in which ACOA had tried and failed to 
harness state public accommodation law and the enforcement authority of the 
New York State Division on Human Rights against an airline owned by the 
South African government. Since the South African government made it 
almost impossible for Black Americans to get visas to travel to South Africa, 
only white passengers generally flew on SAA flights. South Africa as a 
sovereign entity could not be sued directly, so ACOA and New York Attorney 
General Louis J. Lefkowitz targeted the airline (which had waived its 
sovereignty in exchange for permission to fly into the United States). As 
Lefkowitz argued, SAA’s refusal to provide transportation to passengers 
without South African visas meant the airline was functionally barring Black 
passengers from its flights.61 The New York Supreme Court refused to allow 
New York officials to explore the matter, since the discriminatory act in 
question was really that of the Republic of South Africa, and the airline was 
bound by international passenger documentation requirements. As the court 
explained: “Our courts and administrative agencies have no power to act when 
the remedy sought calls into question the sovereign power of a foreign 
government.”62 Many were critical of the decision, suggesting that the courts 
were quick to dismiss SAA’s own liability under New York law for fear of 
inserting themselves into foreign affairs.63 And the court’s use of the act of 
state doctrine here would complicate ACOA’s legal strategy going forward. 
 
61 See generally Grisinger, supra note 22. 
62 South African Airways v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651, 655 (Sup. Ct. 
1970); see Alona E. Evans, Judicial Decisions, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 403 (1971) (summarizing the 
South African Airways decision). 
63 See Lillich, supra note 21, at 156 (“[T]he court misconstrued the act of state doctrine and 
misapplied the concept that states may not interfere in matters of foreign affairs.”); Rideout, supra 
note 21, at 481 n.50 (“[T]he court failed to distinguish among the doctrines of sovereign immunity, 
act of state, and federal foreign relations power. The resulting confusion and uncertainty could have 
been avoided by basing the decision directly on sovereign immunity grounds.”); William C. 
Whittemore III, Recent Decisions, 6 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 175, 182, 185 (1971) (criticizing the Division’s 
“failure to address itself sufficiently to the international law arguments inherent in the case” and the 
court’s narrow interpretation and arguing that “it would seem that the Division should have had 
jurisdiction to raise certain questions through a public hearing concerning SAA’s activities in New 
York State which do not directly call into question the ‘foreign policy’ of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa”); James P. Chandler, Note, 13 HARV. INT’L L.J. 132, 135 (1972) (“[W]hile 
visa policy is properly within the discretion of the South African Government, commercial activity 
in the United States collateral to that policy is illegal insofar as it results in systematic discrimination 
against non-white United States citizens.”). 
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The CCHR (which had joined the complaint as a party in May 197364) 
rejected the Times’ claims that the Constitution limited its broad statutory 
antidiscrimination authority. The Commission itself had been created to 
enforce the “declared policy of combating the practice of discrimination on 
the basis of race, creed, color or national origin, as a threat to our democratic 
institutions.”65 The Commission (represented here by New York City’s 
Corporation Counsel) saw no conflict with the First Amendment; in 1973, 
there were very few limitations on the regulation of employment ads and 
other commercial speech,66 and, lawyers argued, banning discrimination in 
job ads “is a reasonable regulation of the commercial aspects of the press.”67 
And what the Commission was asking for was not standardless or otherwise 
burdensome: “It should be clear that any classified advertisement for 
employment in South Africa is generally understood by the management of 
the New York Times and its readers and [sic] intended to mean that Black 
people are not wanted.”68 Barbara Hoffman, representing the CCHR at the 
CCHR’s hearing on the motion to dismiss, pointed out that the burden on 
the Times was minimal: South Africa’s discrimination was open and 
notorious, distinctive, and clearly known to the Times (evidenced by ACOA’s 
repeated letters telling them about it).69 In addition, the only liability the 
Times faced was a cease-and-desist order barring them from publishing such 
ads in the future.70 
The CCHR also rejected the idea that the Constitution reserved this 
matter to the federal government. In fact, their lawyers argued, “National 
policy in the area of civil rights has long favored the assumption by state and 
local governments of primary responsibility for protecting the civil rights of 
their citizens”—Title VII’s relationship to state and local agencies was one 
example—and “the United States has a direct interest in the effective 
functioning of agencies such as the New York City Commission on Human 
Rights.”71 If in fact foreign policy was implicated, the CCHR was acting in 
concert with, not in opposition to, the federal government’s anti-apartheid 
 
64 Amended Complaint, Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human 
Rights May 22, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6). 
65 Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 5, 
Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights June 2, 1973) 
[hereinafter CCHR Opposition Memorandum], in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, 
Box 45, Folder 7). 
66 See generally Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 
(1973); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, (1964); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
67 CCHR Opposition Memorandum, supra note 65, at 23. 
68 Id. at 25. 
69 CCHR Hearing Transcript, supra note 43, at 75.  
70 CCHR Opposition Memorandum, supra note 65, at 26. 
71 Id. at 10. 
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positions. (And that position was constitutionally required: “a treaty or 
formal agreement or other executive action approving South Africa’s policy 
of apartheid and giving South Africa the right to discriminate against citizens of 
the United States and more specifically against inhabitants of the city and state of 
New York would be unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments.”72) 
It was the failure of the federal government to do more than speak sharply 
against South Africa that motivated American anti-apartheid activists. 
But, lawyers for the CCHR emphasized, foreign policy was not implicated 
in this inquiry into “the discriminatory effects on New York citizens in New 
York City” from ads in the Times, a New York corporation.73 The task of 
evaluating the consequences of apartheid within New York City was, lawyers 
argued, squarely within the CCHR’s jurisdiction. The use of the act of state 
doctrine was “similarly inappropriate” given that there was no element of 
extraterritoriality.74 The South African Airways case was thus inapplicable. 
Lawyers for ACOA and the other complainants echoed these arguments. 
Here, unlike South African Airways, there was no challenge to a foreign 
government; the act of state doctrine was thus “totally irrelevant” and the 
Times’ use of it “hopelessly transparent.”75 Nor was this a matter of foreign 
policy, they argued. This case did not require a deep dive into conditions on 
the ground in South Africa (especially once the complainants amended their 
complaint so that claims about South African “laws and practices” became 
claims only about South African “laws.”76) Nor did Zschernig prevent the 
CCHR from simply reading another country’s formal laws where relevant to 
its own inquiry. Although the Commission would need to look at South 
Africa’s laws, “it is inconceivable that this reference will have any consequence 
for U.S. foreign policy.”77 The CCHR had the authority to police 
discriminatory activities within New York City, and that, LCCRUL lawyers 
argued, was what it was attempting to do. 
At the end of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Commissioners 
Jerome M. Becker and Frank P. Mangino rejected the Times’ constitutional 
arguments and kept jurisdiction over the case. On the foreign affairs point, 
the commissioners found that “the question here relates to an alleged act 
solely within the control of The New York Times . . . . No foreign policy is 
 
72 Id. at 11. 
73 Id. at 14. 
74 Id. 
75 Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 15, 16, Am. Comm. on 
Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights June 2, 1973) [hereinafter 
Complainants’ Opposition Memorandum], in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, 
Folder 4). 
76 Motion to Amend, Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human 
Rights June 6, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6). 
77 Complainants’ Opposition Memorandum, supra note 75, at 3. 
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involved here.”78 And as to the First Amendment arguments, the 
Commissioners explained, “We are not questioning here the practices of the 
editorial policy, nor the reporting practices of the newspaper, but rather the 
commercial business practice of its Advertising Department.”79 The First 
Amendment did not protect the Times from such regulation. 
The Times quickly turned to the New York Supreme Court, arguing on 
constitutional grounds that the CCHR had no jurisdiction: 
What is involved here is not the question of what policy the United States 
should take towards South Africa. It is, instead, whether a city is entitled to 
establish its own foreign policy. And—even more important to the press—
what is involved here is whether a city commission may presume to impose 
its will as to what material may be printed in the press.80 
ACOA and the other complainants, moving to intervene in the 
proceedings, pointed out the consequences to New Yorkers of a narrow 
reading of the CCHR’s jurisdiction: 
Movants consider the publication of advertisements for racially segregated 
employment in South Africa as only one of many ways in which the racially 
offensive policies of South Africa reach into the United States and operate 
within the borders of our own country. If the Act of State doctrine is 
converted into an immunity bath for such domestic operations, this will 
seriously hamper the efforts of movants to continue to invoke the aid of the 
courts of this country in putting an end to what movants consider to be a 
variety of illegal activities occurring in this country, related to the racial 
policies of South Africa.81 
The Commission’s action—a limited proceeding that would not affect South 
Africa—was thus an appropriate response to South Africa’s own policy which 
did affect New Yorkers. 
To the contrary, the Times argued, calling out the words “South Africa” as 
an expression of discrimination “would, in and of itself, violate the doctrine 
of federal primacy in the foreign policy sphere previously referred to.”82 
 
78 CCHR Hearing Transcript, supra note 43, at 79. 
79 Id. 
80 Memorandum of Petitioner The New York Times Company at 32, N.Y. Times Co. v. City 
of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 349 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (No. 16581/73), in McDougall 
Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6). 
81 Affirmation of Peter Weiss in Support of Motion to Intervene at 2, N.Y. Times Co. v. City 
of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 349 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (No. 16581/73), in McDougall 
Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6). 
82 Reply Memorandum of Petitioner the New York Times Company at 5, N.Y. Times Co. v. 
City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 349 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (No. 16581/73), in 
McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6). 
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Changing foreign policy was, they charged, what complainants and the 
Commission wanted to do: 
The hardly disguised intent of complainants is to cause economic injury to 
the Republic of South Africa because of the failure of the world community, 
including the United States, to do so. This action is no different in principle 
from attempts to impose a boycott on sales of goods from, services in, or 
travel to the Republic of South Africa.83 
Any such policy “should be adopted, if at all, on the federal level. To hold 
otherwise[ ] could easily result in precisely the patchwork quilt of varying and 
possibly inconsistent local ordinances relating to foreign affairs that federal 
control of foreign policy is designed to avoid.”84 Boycotts were not for local 
commissions to manage. 
The New York Supreme Court rejected the Times’ arguments and allowed 
the CCHR to continue its work. Justice Samuel J. Silverman agreed that the 
CCHR was not empowered to investigate South African apartheid policy—
but said that was not what was happening. Here the advertisement appeared 
in “a New York newspaper, addressed to residents of New York, and no doubt 
such residents, reading the advertisement against the background of general 
information in this country about South Africa’s racial policies, will believe 
that it makes a very substantial difference whether an applicant for 
employment is white or black.”85 The court noted that there were several open 
questions for a CCHR hearing to address: 
what, if any, effect the publication and reading of such advertisements may 
have in fomenting racial discord among the citizens of New York of various 
races; and whether that effect is such as to be more than an unavoidable 
incident of an area—foreign relations—which is beyond the jurisdiction of 
the State or any of its political subdivisions, or whether it is so independent 
an evil as to fall within the general power of the State and its political 
subdivisions to regulate acts within their territories.86 
These were exactly the kinds of questions that would be answered as the 
Commission moved forward. 
Given this go-ahead by the court, the Commission scheduled hearings in 
January 1974 to delve into the messages sent by the job ads. Lawyers for the 
CCHR and for the complainants had coordinated strategy, with the 
complainants (represented by LCCRUL and joined by Peter Weiss of the 
 
83 Id. at 6. 
84 Id. at 7. 
85 N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 349 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942 (Sup. 
Ct. 1973). 
86 Id. at 943. 
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Center for Constitutional Rights, who had been president of ACOA until 
1972) agreeing to find witnesses, and the lawyers at the CCHR agreeing to 
make sure that at least one of the commissioners at the hearing was a lawyer.87 
Over two days in January, commissioners Frank Mangino and Howard 
Thorkelson (both lawyers) heard from witnesses from academia and the 
business world about what they understood the ads to mean.88 The witnesses 
agreed that they would assume these South African employers sought only 
white applicants, and that as Black applicants they would not bother to apply 
for such jobs (nor would they want them if they got them—some testimony 
focused on the conditions for Black employees working in South Africa, and 
for interracial couples). Hope Stevens, a Black lawyer and president of the 
Uptown Chamber of Commerce, stated that “‘South Africa’ suggests the 
slogan of the South African people as reported to me over the years by the 
New York Times, the horse and the rider. The horse being the black man in 
South Africa and the rider being the white man.”89 Richard Clarke, a Black 
executive recruiter, asked if he would recommend that Black job-seekers apply 
to such jobs, responded “No, not under the threat of the thought of having 
lost my marbles, no.”90 The ad posted by the “Equal Opportunity Employer” 
came in for particular derision. Dr. Hugh H. Smythe, a former ambassador 
to Syria and Malta, suggested that such language was just in there to placate 
the Times and the United States, “but I would also know, as a black looking at 
that, I would be out of my mind even thinking of sending an application to 
that advertiser.”91 Stevens suggested that such language was “absolute 
nonsense so far as I am concerned because anyone reading this who didn’t 
recognize this was a joke insofar as black persons were concerned, would be 
barren of any understanding of the facts as published in the New York Times 
for the past 35 years to my certain knowledge.”92 
The Commission also heard testimony that the ads caused affirmative 
harm within New York City—particularly relevant given that one of the 
CCHR’s tasks was “[t]o foster mutual understanding and respect among all 
racial, religious and ethnic groups in the city of New York.”93 Stevens 
suggested that such an ad “would suggest a sarcastic and brutal reminder of 
the political, social and cultural attitudes and policy of the government and 
 
87 Memorandum to File from Rod Boggs at 2 (May 1, 1973), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24 
(MSS 415, Box 2, Folder 8). 
88 See generally CCHR Hearing Transcript, supra note 43. 
89 Id. at 199, 203. 
90 Id. at 197. 
91 Id. at 128. 
92 Id. at 206. 
93 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-4.0(1) (1972). 
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businessmen in South Africa.”94 More than insulting, it was dangerous: “this 
kind of provocative advertising adds to our burden in peacekeeping, in 
maintaining order, in respect for law because it incites people to violence.”95 
Such an ad “would be an incitement cloaked in such disgust that a person or 
persons of uneven temperament might be provoked to brick throwing and 
other expressions of hostility.”96 The danger to New Yorkers was clear. 
Robert P. Smith, the manager of the Times Advertising Acceptability 
Department, expressed some concern about broadening the scope of his 
department’s work: “[I]f we are going to refuse advertising from South Africa 
because of internal policies, who knows where it would lead?”97 (This 
argument was perhaps somewhat undercut by the subsequent testimony of 
ACOA executive director George Houser about the multiple edits the 
department had required to an anti-SAA ad that ACOA had placed in 1969.98) 
Certain ads the department rejected out of hand: “We won’t accept 
advertisements for personalized horoscopes, for matrimonial offers, for 
medical devices that should only be used, if at all, by a licensed practitioner.”99 
They did not, however, look into whether “equal opportunity employer” 
claims were true.100 
In a closing statement, complainants’ attorney Peter Weiss called 
arguments about foreign policy “a bogeyman” since the matter at hand was 
really about “an act of a New York corporation addressed to and affecting 
citizens of New York.”101 An order against the New York Times would do 
“exactly nothing” to change foreign policy but would “underscore one of the 
avowed goals of our foreign policy as exemplified by many votes of the United 
States in the United Nations and by other declarations made by high 
government officials which are in opposition to precisely the same policy of 
discrimination.”102 The CCHR made its own post-hearing argument that this 
exactly was the kind of local matter over which it had authority: “While South 
Africa is free to maintain any internal policy it pleases, the Constitution 
surely does not guarantee a foreign sovereign the right to publicize its intent 
to discriminate or to facilitate that discrimination in New York City.”103 The 
 
94 CCHR Hearing Transcript, supra note 43, at 203. 
95 Id. at 204. 
96 Id. at 204-05. 
97 Id. at 151-153, 155. 
98 See id. at 170, 175-180. 
99 Id. at 156. 
100 Id. at 154. 
101 Id. at 243. 
102 Id. at 243-244. 
103 Post-Hearing Memorandum of the City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights at 14, Am. 
Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights Mar. 7, 1974), in McDougall 
Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 5). 
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Times, by printing the ads, had aided South African discrimination in New 
York City in violation of the law. And the newspaper “undermines respect for 
the anti-discrimination laws of this City, State, and Country and acts contrary 
to public policy and law” by opposing apartheid in its editorial section but 
promoting it in its ads.104 
In response to the facts gathered at the hearing, the Times rejected any 
conclusion that the geographical location “South Africa” (which they noted 
was “an indispensable part of an employment advertisement”) could be itself 
a code word for discrimination.105 Such an argument was “simply a 
perversion of the English language” and “so extreme as to border on the 
ludicrous.”106 The Times further impugned anti-apartheid activists’ sincerity 
about the specific harms the ads caused in New York City. Activists’ “hardly 
disguised” goal was “to cause economic injury to the Republic of South 
Africa because of the failure of the world community, including the United 
States, to do so.”107 What complainants were asking for, the Times charged, 
was to shut down business connections between the United States and South 
Africa. While Congress, or the president, could do this, a municipal 
commission could not. 
And to read New York City’s law to ban this language would either place 
a huge burden on the Times to investigate every country’s laws or require the 
paper to stop running such ads. Further, they suggested, the controversial 
nature of the ads might be relevant for First Amendment purposes. Although 
most job ads clearly fell within the category of commercial speech, “the 
advertising in this case—and, must [sic] assuredly, the objections to it—have 
a distinctly political character” that deserved more protection.108 
The CCHR rejected the Times’ arguments about the act of state doctrine, 
since the facts of the cases were so very different. The doctrine, attorneys 
argued, “has never been invoked in a case involving private parties and a 
government agency to preclude the enforcement of human rights derived 
from legislation enacted in the forum in which the action is being 
entertained.”109 ACOA’s attorneys similarly argued that the limited relevance 
of South African law to the inquiry did not automatically make this a foreign 
policy case. Instead, “New York City has a legitimate interest and absolute 
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right to protect its citizens from the acts of New York corporations which 
publish discriminatory advertising. . . . Even when there is an incidental 
effect upon some foreign nation, this power is clear.”110 To determine 
otherwise “would mean states and municipalities are powerless to regulate 
any goods or activities within their jurisdictions which originate from outside 
the United States regardless of their local effect.”111 This would weaken the 
CCHR and establish a two-track system of discrimination. 
In July 1974, the Commission issued its determination that the ads 
expressed discrimination, and the Times had aided discrimination by printing 
them; the paper was ordered to cease and desist printing such ads in the 
future. The Commission remained steadfast that its regulation was 
constitutionally permissible. On the First Amendment point, the CCHR 
relied on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, in which the Court had upheld a 
similar municipal commission ban on sex-segregated employment ads. 
Regarding the foreign policy and act of state doctrine challenges, the 
Commission found it was “not precluded from examining the laws of South 
Africa on their face and from ascertaining that they are in force and effect to 
determine whether the advertisements for employment in South Africa 
express discrimination.”112 The evidence demonstrated both that South 
African employment was segregated, and that 
among residents of New York City, and in particular Black residents, the 
extensive system of racial segregation and discrimination in the Republic of 
South Africa is well-known. (Ironically, several of Complainants’ witnesses 
gave credit to Respondent The New York Times for establishing this 
notoriety.) ‘South Africa’ has come to have a denotative meaning, in the 
common understanding, other than its geographical reference—i.e., the 
principle of white supremacy expressed in laws which require racial 
segregation in many areas of activity and in particular in employment.113 
The Commission rejected the idea that it was overreaching; instead, it 
argued, it was in no way stepping on the foreign affairs authority reserved to 
the federal government. There was no act of state present, and this was not 
“an intrusion by this Commission into the foreign affairs of this country.”114 
Ads were ads, and, “when published in New York City and addressed basically 
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to New York residents,” they were subject to regulation by New York City 
authorities.115 This the Constitution did not bar. 
CCHR chair Eleanor Holmes Norton commended the decision as 
“precedent-setting and eminently fair”116 and ACOA and its lawyers trumpeted 
the victory. ACOA president Judge William H. Booth and ACOA executive 
director George Houser, in a joint statement, called the Commission’s order 
“a landmark decision in protecting the people of New York City against the 
intrusion of the racial discrimination of South Africa’s apartheid system. No 
longer will the ‘Whites Only’ laws of apartheid be exported to the 
employment pages of the City newspapers.”117 The LCCRUL similarly made 
the kind of broad claims they had avoided in their legal arguments, touting 
the decision’s “wide-ranging implications for the South African white-
minority regime’s attempts to encourage immigration of whites to that 
racially-divided country” in order to keep white South Africans in power and 
Black South Africans subordinated.118 Having apparently found an approach 
to anti-apartheid activism free from constitutional roadblocks and stubborn 
bureaucrats, ACOA asked “all foes of apartheid, whether of the South African 
or the U.S. variety, to follow up the landmark decision of the New York City 
Human Rights Commission by appropriate action in other cities and states.”119 
Times attorney Floyd Abrams, by contrast, characterized the CCHR 
decision as “so extreme and so extraordinary as to border on the bizarre” and 
successfully asked the New York Supreme Court to stay the CCHR order.120 
The Times would prevail in the New York courts going forward, as judges 
proved wary of both the CCHR’s statutory arguments and its constitutional 
ones. In October 1974, the New York Supreme Court vacated the CCHR 
order, in a decision that mixed statutory and constitutional concerns. Justice 
Nathaniel T. Helman determined that “none of the advertisements make any 
reference to race, and . . . the Times can hardly be charged from the language 
of the advertisements themselves with evincing an intent, directly or 
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indirectly, to participate in a program of discrimination.”121 The newspaper 
could not, thus, be held liable. The court found that the First Amendment 
posed no problem to the Commission’s regulation,122 but expressed concern 
about the foreign policy questions. 
Reading South African Airways as a case that barred complainants from 
indirectly attacking South African policy, the court found that here “the 
Commission, in effect, was questioning the employment methods and 
practices of a foreign government.”123 This was inappropriate; “[e]conomic 
sanctions should be adopted, wherever necessary, on a Federal level and not 
by a local anti-discrimination agency which at best can only become involved 
in international problems far removed from the scope of its limited 
jurisdiction.”124 
No deference was given to the CCHR’s interpretation of the evidence or 
the statute; instead, the court was clearly worried about the potential for 
mischief that a broad reading of the statute might cause. Here “the present 
advertisements made no reference to race or color directly or indirectly. This 
fact, combined with the expressed reluctance of our Courts to invade the 
policies of other nations, supports the position of the Times that no 
discrimination statute was violated by the newspaper.”125 
The court expressed concern that the Commission was trying to stretch 
its jurisdiction: 
For the Commission to enter every foreign area where patterns of 
discrimination appear by imposing restraints on the solicitation of employees 
based in the United States, through the medium of fair advertising, involves 
an assumption of jurisdiction which was certainly never contemplated by the 
legislative body which created the Commission.126 
The Commission appeared to be meddling in matters beyond its authority 
and expertise. 
LCCRUL attorney Douglas Wachholz privately criticized the decision, 
writing to Booth that Justice Helman “is in error—and even shoddy. . . . 
Unfortunately, I do not believe he understood the issues at all.”127 One 
commentator noted that Justice Helman’s “myopic interpretation of anti-
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discrimination legislation embodies a complete disregard for the strong 
public policy of New York.”128 However, the Times continued to prevail on 
appeal. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in a two-sentence opinion, 
concluded that “[t]he language of the advertisements is not such as to indicate 
an intent on the part of petitioner to participate in a program of 
discrimination.”129 The Times was thus not liable. 
Lawyers for the CCHR and the complainants pushed back vehemently. 
In moving for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, Wachholz 
argued, “the appellate courts have an obligation to clarify the law in this 
important area, and, in any event, cannot allow Justice Helman’s opinion to 
stand as precedent since it is in conflict with the entire body of law governing 
judicial deference to the findings of the City of New York Commission on 
Human Rights.”130 On appeal, the Corporation Counsel argued on behalf of 
the CCHR that the New York Supreme Court had misapplied the act of state 
doctrine and “made no distinction . . . between a local agency impermissibly 
attempting to direct its jurisdiction at the discriminatory employment system 
of a foreign government and correctly exercising its jurisdiction over the 
actions of a New York corporation in New York City.”131 The Times had failed 
to demonstrate exactly how the CCHR’s actions ran afoul of federal interests; 
“the emasculation of the enforcement of the City’s anti-discrimination laws 
against a local corporation, because of the incidental effect on foreign 
employers, would appear to be inconsistent with the federal foreign affairs 
policy as reflected in our Constitution and the international agreements to 
which we are a party.”132 Pointing to New York’s own constitutionally 
protected powers, the Commission’s lawyers argued that courts should be 
loath to limit local authority unless there was a demonstrable conflict with 
federal authority; “the powers granted to the states under the Tenth 
Amendment have never been held to yield to federal foreign policy under the 
Supremacy clause of Article VI, Section 2 of our Constitution except in the 
face of inconsistent treaties, international compacts or executive 
agreements.”133 No such conflict was present here. 
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LCCRUL lawyers raised additional constitutional claims as they pointed 
to the way these “insulting and provocative” ads injured Black New Yorkers.134 
Gesturing toward the U.S. Supreme Court’s Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, lawyers suggested that such ads “represent the very ‘badges 
and incidents of slavery’ which courts have sought to extirpate from our 
society.”135 Both the Thirteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment 
were invoked as the LCCRUL cited Brown v. Board of Education and Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co. as evidence that the Court “has specifically recognized 
the profound effect on black persons of the constant reminder that they are 
considered inferior.”136 
However, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts, stating 
that ads “which merely refer to [South Africa] as the situs of the employment 
and which do not recite, on the surface, any discriminatory conditions do not 
express discrimination within the meaning of the New York City 
antidiscrimination laws.”137 The court declined to consider “South Africa” as 
code for racial discrimination, since “mere geographical reference to the situs 
of employment does not carry with it an expression of discrimination, directly 
or indirectly; nor does the reference to geographical location necessarily 
imply that the prospective employer engages, in New York, in practices 
required, approved, or condoned by the laws of South Africa.”138 
Distinguishing a line of cases involving code words (“deceptive tokens added 
to coyly and subtly communicate discriminatory criteri[a]”), the court 
declined to find that “South Africa”—which provided “essential employment 
information that the employer may legitimately communicate to a 
prospective employee”—was such sleight of hand.139 And if the ads did not 
discriminate, the Times could not be liable for printing them. 
Like the New York Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals 
seemed troubled by the fact that the complainants, and the CCHR, were 
fighting the job ads as part of a broader attack on apartheid, and read their 
actions through that lens. The Commission had gone too far “by imposing an 
economic boycott of the Republic of South Africa.”140 A strike against 
apartheid policy, however local, was beyond the Commission’s authority; the 
CCHR “was without jurisdiction to make and enforce its own foreign 
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policy.”141 Citing Underhill and quoting Zschernig, the court stated that while 
state courts could “read, construe and apply the laws of a foreign country in 
a routine fashion, they may not launch inquiries into the righteousness of 
foreign law, thereby affecting ‘international relations in a persistent and subtle 
way.’”142 Neither, then, could municipal commissions. 
What did it mean to affect foreign policy? The bar the court established 
was quite low; in Zschernig the Supreme Court had worried about the Oregon 
inheritance law’s “great potential for disruption or embarrassment,”143 but 
here the court referred only to “an inquiry that might have been considered 
offensive by the Republic of South Africa and which might have been an 
embarrassment to those charged with the conduct of our Nation’s foreign 
policy.”144 Apparently any potential offense, however great or small, was 
enough; “experience has established that real or imagined wrongs perceived 
by another government may create significant international disputes, perhaps 
even resulting in armed conflicts.”145 As the court warned, “[t]he peace and 
security of the United States has not been left to the whim of but one State 
whose actions would have consequences, perhaps dire, for all the States.”146 
Anti-apartheid activists were thus directed back to the federal government—
and to the White House—to register their concern; the local commission 
path, which had earlier seemed so promising, was now decisively blocked. 
One judge concurred, agreeing that “there was no prohibited expression 
of discrimination in the advertisements printed by the Times” but declining 
to reach the foreign affairs question.147 Two other judges dissented, seeing the 
issue as one of clear domestic discrimination well within the CCHR’s 
authority to remedy. “South Africa,” they found, was indeed sufficient to 
signal discrimination: “An advertisement setting forth South Africa as the 
location of the employment clearly connotes, as effectively as code words, that 
‘Only Whites Need Apply.’”148 On the factual conclusions, they argued that 
the evidence presented “was more than sufficient to support its determination 
that the advertisements were impermissibly discriminatory and that the 
discrimination was so pervasive that the remedial action ordered by the 
commission, though broad, was within its discretion.”149 Since the CCHR’s 
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decision was supported by sufficient evidence, they argued, the order should 
have been sustained on review.150 
Nor, the dissenters argued, was the Commission preempted by any 
foreign affairs conflict; the New York Times, not South Africa, was the actor 
in question, and the activity had occurred within New York City. 
Complainants’ general hostility to South African policy did not bar them 
from pursuing this complaint; “whatever may have been the precipitating 
motivation of those who originally brought this matter to the official 
attention of the commission, the limited conduct which was the gravamen of 
the proceeding before the commission here simply was not a boycott.”151 
Targeted litigation was, after all, a well-recognized strategy by groups 
seeking social change. 
Finally, the dissenters rejected the First Amendment arguments. While 
the majority had not reached these issues, the dissenters argued that the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bigelow v. Virginia and Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, which extended more 
constitutional protections to commercial speech, nonetheless contained 
limitations for discriminatory ads and “cannot serve to protect the publication 
of discriminatory material such as that before us now.”152 
Lawyers at the LCCRUL were disappointed by their defeat, especially 
since they believed that the Court of Appeals was incorrect on both the facts 
and the law.153 They considered their next steps, if any; they sought 
reargument before the New York Court of Appeals but determined that 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court was unlikely, given that there were 
independent state grounds upon which the decision rested.154 Others were 
also critical. One observer suggested that the Court of Appeals’ warning that 
the Commission’s actions could be “‘dire, for all the states’” was “so ridiculous 
that respect for the judiciary inhibits further comment on it.”155 Another 
concluded that the Court of Appeals had established a practical rule that 
CCHR now had to give foreign businesses more leeway than domestic ones; 
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“the court has for all purposes rewritten the anti-discrimination provisions of 
the New York City Administrative Code.”156 
Although thwarted by the courts’ narrow statutory and broad 
constitutional interpretations, the activists’ efforts perhaps had not been 
entirely in vain. As LCCRUL lawyer T. Michael Peay concluded to the 
intervenors, at least the litigation “was an invaluable contribution to the on-
going effort to heighten the awareness of Americans about the unconscionable 
employment and race situation existing in South Africa.”157 
*      *      * 
Although the CCHR did not prevail in court, its constitutional strategies 
are worthy of study as part of a broader conversation about municipal 
administrative constitutionalism in action. This case study demonstrates the 
importance of putting administrators, not courts, at the center of the 
narrative, and of expanding the study of administrative constitutionalism 
beyond federal agencies to state and local ones. Here lawyers at the New York 
City Commission on Human Rights used the Constitution to defend their 
statutory right to fight discrimination within New York City, however it 
manifested itself. In a globalizing world, discrimination abroad had 
consequences within the United States. This meant an almost inevitable 
conflict between broad local antidiscrimination authority (the kind of 
constitutional authority that states and localities often took for granted) and 
(quasi-) foreign policy challenges they may not have previously encountered. 
When the Times deployed constitutional arguments to fight a complaint based 
on New York City’s Law on Human Rights, the Commission (alongside the 
LCCRUL) was required to develop its own constitutional arguments about 
the limited nature of First Amendment and foreign affairs restrictions on its 
work.  
This case study also raises questions about deference to administrative 
expertise in the local context. Here reviewing courts extended little or no 
deference to administrators’ decisionmaking, even when the subject 
(discrimination) was generally within commissioners’ remit. Judges’ apparent 
concern about embarrassing South Africa, or disrupting the U.S.-South 
Africa relationship, meant that New York courts pushed back against the 
CCHR’s assertion of authority, seemingly more concerned about the activists 
who had initiated the complaint and the potential harms of regulation than 
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the testimony of Black New Yorkers, the findings of the Commissioners, or the 
constitutional arguments developed by the Commission’s lawyers. 
Interesting questions remain about the relationships local and state 
human rights commissions have with activists, with courts, and with other 
state and local institutions (not least, the city’s Corporation Counsel). When 
do these relationships resemble dynamics at the federal level, and when do 
they differ? As scholars continue to investigate federal administrators using 
constitutional arguments to define their authority, and agencies as places 
where both state actors and nonstate actors interpret the Constitution, state 
and municipal agencies should be part of the conversation.   
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